Optimization & Control of Network & Distributed Energy Resources I – Invited Special Session

C2L-F: Optimization & Control of Network & Distributed Energy Resources I - Invited Special Session

Session Type: Lecture
Session Code: C2L-F
Location: Room 6
Date & Time: Friday March 24, 2023 (10:00-11:00)
Chair: Mads Almassalkhi
Track: 12
Paper IDPaper TitleAuthorsAbstract
3023Bidirectional Electric Vehicle Fleets for Spatial and Temporal ArbitrageKyri Baker, Constance CrozierTraditional energy arbitrage has been performed with large-scale market participants strategically buying and selling energy at key times (e.g., buying during “off-peak” times and selling during “on-peak” times). This is typically performed with large stationary energy storage owned by large firms. However, the landscape of energy arbitrage is changing due to advancements in distributed energy resource capabilities and new market mechanisms. In particular, recent years have introduced the concept of mobile energy storage. This presentation demonstrates how arbitrage can be performed not only temporary, but spatially, by physically moving energy assets across time and space.
3083Market Mechanism for Energy Storage Bidding in Multi-Interval Electricity MarketsRajni Kant Bansal{1}, Pengcheng You{2}, Dennice Gayme{1}, Enrique Mallada{1}We study a novel market mechanism that accounts for storage degradation and model the competition between heterogeneous participants in a multi-interval electricity market. Drawing ideas from the linear supply function bidding that maps dispatch power to prices, storage bids a novel energy-cycling function that maps cycle-depth to prices. The resulting market-clearing process yields corresponding schedules and payments based on traditional energy prices for power supply and per-cycle prices for storage utilization. We show that the competitive equilibrium, assuming price-taking participants, aligns with the social planner problem and maximizes individual profits simultaneously. Also, the proposed market design incentivizes participants to reveal their truthful cost at the competitive equilibrium, signaling efficient market operation. We then characterize the strategic behavior of individual participants and investigate their impact on market conditions. Our analysis shows that the Nash equilibrium in the proposed market design, assuming price-anticipating participants, aligns with the competitive equilibria, asymptotically, as the number of participants increases in the market. Interestingly, increasing the number of participants in either group counters the market power of all the participants driving market equilibrium towards a competitive market.
3174Solving the Timescales Challenge in Energy Resilience via ControlsSoumya KunduA global drive towards decarbonization, alongside advances in sensing and control technologies, are fueling rapid transformations in the energy infrastructures. As the penetration of distributed clean energy resources increases, novel operational challenges emerge related to, but not limited to, the reduction of system inertia and ever-shrinking separation in operational time-scales. In this talk, we will cover some of our recent work on distributed intelligence and control solutions to enable safe and reliable grid operations across multiple timescales. Using elements from robust nonlinear controls, polynomial optimization, and operator theory, we will present methods for modular and scalable verification and embedding of safety and reliability specifications in inverter-interfaced energy systems.